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Money & Accountability · FDIC BankFind Suite

Bank Health,
Quarter by Quarter

Four times a year, every insured bank in America files a Call Report with the FDIC, and the health of the whole system prints out in the aggregate: who is growing, who is quietly carrying bad loans, what the rate cycle did to the bonds on their books, and which banks did not survive the weekend. This is that ledger, read quarter by quarter.

~4,500 insured banks tracked Illustrative
Industry assets
$24.4T
Net income, latest Q
$67B
Industry ROA
1.08%
Assets failed, 2023
$532B
Schedule RC · Geography

Where the Banks Are

Illustrative

Start with the map the title promises. Each state is shaded by the number of FDIC-insured banks headquartered there - a count of charters, not branches. The dark band is the farm belt: 382 banks call Texas home, and the upper Midwest still runs hundreds of small community banks apiece. The coasts run comparatively few, larger banks. Together these 4,581 charters hold the nation's deposits.

Alabama: 107 banks headquartered, $340B in assets Alaska: 4 banks headquartered, $20B in assets Arizona: 16 banks headquartered, $120B in assets Colorado: 69 banks headquartered, $210B in assets Florida: 95 banks headquartered, $460B in assets Georgia: 141 banks headquartered, $520B in assets Indiana: 107 banks headquartered, $240B in assets Kansas: 198 banks headquartered, $150B in assets Maine: 19 banks headquartered, $60B in assets Massachusetts: 95 banks headquartered, $640B in assets Minnesota: 241 banks headquartered, $470B in assets New Jersey: 59 banks headquartered, $320B in assets North Carolina: 61 banks headquartered, $3.6T in assets North Dakota: 66 banks headquartered, $60B in assets Oklahoma: 166 banks headquartered, $210B in assets Pennsylvania: 130 banks headquartered, $690B in assets South Dakota: 56 banks headquartered, $3.5T in assets Texas: 382 banks headquartered, $1.2T in assets Wyoming: 23 banks headquartered, $30B in assets Connecticut: 33 banks headquartered, $190B in assets Missouri: 214 banks headquartered, $380B in assets West Virginia: 45 banks headquartered, $90B in assets Illinois: 329 banks headquartered, $980B in assets New Mexico: 37 banks headquartered, $50B in assets Arkansas: 72 banks headquartered, $150B in assets California: 151 banks headquartered, $980B in assets Delaware: 22 banks headquartered, $1.2T in assets District of Columbia: 6 banks headquartered, $20B in assets Hawaii: 7 banks headquartered, $80B in assets Iowa: 244 banks headquartered, $210B in assets Kentucky: 116 banks headquartered, $150B in assets Maryland: 40 banks headquartered, $190B in assets Michigan: 78 banks headquartered, $300B in assets Mississippi: 64 banks headquartered, $130B in assets Montana: 46 banks headquartered, $40B in assets New Hampshire: 15 banks headquartered, $40B in assets New York: 95 banks headquartered, $2.1T in assets Ohio: 140 banks headquartered, $5.1T in assets Oregon: 24 banks headquartered, $90B in assets Tennessee: 124 banks headquartered, $330B in assets Utah: 41 banks headquartered, $640B in assets Virginia: 77 banks headquartered, $640B in assets Washington: 45 banks headquartered, $190B in assets Wisconsin: 151 banks headquartered, $260B in assets Nebraska: 148 banks headquartered, $180B in assets South Carolina: 43 banks headquartered, $130B in assets Idaho: 11 banks headquartered, $40B in assets Nevada: 12 banks headquartered, $90B in assets Vermont: 11 banks headquartered, $30B in assets Louisiana: 98 banks headquartered, $140B in assets Rhode Island: 7 banks headquartered, $260B in assets
Shade encodes banks headquartered per state (five quantile classes). Alaska and Hawaii are inset by the Albers USA projection; US territories fall outside its frame and appear only in the table.
Most charters
  1. 01 Texas 382 banks
  2. 02 Illinois 329 banks
  3. 03 Iowa 244 banks
  4. 04 Minnesota 241 banks
  5. 05 Missouri 214 banks
Every state, in a table
State Banks Assets Weighted ROA
Texas TX 382 $1.2T 1.18%
Illinois IL 329 $980B 1.02%
Iowa IA 244 $210B 1.21%
Minnesota MN 241 $470B 1.24%
Missouri MO 214 $380B 1.09%
Kansas KS 198 $150B 1.13%
Oklahoma OK 166 $210B 1.19%
Wisconsin WI 151 $260B 1.16%
California CA 151 $980B 0.98%
Nebraska NE 148 $180B 1.22%
Georgia GA 141 $520B 1.07%
Ohio OH 140 $5.1T 1.28%
Pennsylvania PA 130 $690B 1.06%
Tennessee TN 124 $330B 1.15%
Kentucky KY 116 $150B 1.14%
Indiana IN 107 $240B 1.11%
Alabama AL 107 $340B 1.16%
Louisiana LA 98 $140B 1.08%
New York NY 95 $2.1T 1.02%
Florida FL 95 $460B 1.05%
Massachusetts MA 95 $640B 1.08%
Michigan MI 78 $300B 1.09%
Virginia VA 77 $640B 1.11%
Arkansas AR 72 $150B 1.20%
Colorado CO 69 $210B 1.12%
North Dakota ND 66 $60B 1.24%
Mississippi MS 64 $130B 1.19%
North Carolina NC 61 $3.6T 0.92%
New Jersey NJ 59 $320B 1.03%
South Dakota SD 56 $3.5T 1.31%
Montana MT 46 $40B 1.18%
Washington WA 45 $190B 1.07%
West Virginia WV 45 $90B 1.12%
South Carolina SC 43 $130B 1.13%
Utah UT 41 $640B 1.62%
Maryland MD 40 $190B 1.04%
New Mexico NM 37 $50B 1.10%
Connecticut CT 33 $190B 1.00%
Oregon OR 24 $90B 1.05%
Wyoming WY 23 $30B 1.14%
Delaware DE 22 $1.2T 1.44%
Maine ME 19 $60B 1.02%
Arizona AZ 16 $120B 1.06%
New Hampshire NH 15 $40B 1.01%
Nevada NV 12 $90B 1.15%
Idaho ID 11 $40B 1.09%
Vermont VT 11 $30B 1.03%
Rhode Island RI 7 $260B 0.85%
Hawaii HI 7 $80B 1.11%
District of Columbia DC 6 $20B 0.95%
Alaska AK 4 $20B 1.07%

Illustrative stand-ins in the real FDIC shape. Banks = active insured institutions with a head office in the state (BankFind STALP). Assets are booked at the charter's HQ, so states hosting one megabank charter (Ohio, North Carolina, South Dakota, Delaware) carry trillions that are transacted nationwide - a real quirk of where charters sit, not where the money is spent. Swap-point and fetch steps in HANDOFF.md.

Schedule RC · Assets

The Fifteen Largest

Illustrative

Assets are the size of the bank. The top four charters alone hold more than the next fifty combined - and the gap is the whole story of the industry. Beside each name: how fast it grew over the year, and how much of its loan book is going bad. Growth above 0 and noncurrent loans below the 0.62% national line are the healthy reading.

  1. 01
    JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Columbus, OH · N
    $4.02T
    1Y +6.1% NPL 0.55%
  2. 02
    Bank of America, N.A. Charlotte, NC · N
    $2.67T
    1Y +2.4% NPL 0.48%
  3. 03
    Citibank, N.A. Sioux Falls, SD · N
    $1.93T
    1Y -1.2% NPL 0.71%
  4. 04
    Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Sioux Falls, SD · N
    $1.89T
    1Y -0.8% NPL 0.62%
  5. 05
    U.S. Bank, N.A. Cincinnati, OH · N
    $663B
    1Y +1.1% NPL 0.44%
  6. 06
    Goldman Sachs Bank USA New York, NY · NM
    $555B
    1Y +3.7% NPL 0.39%
  7. 07
    PNC Bank, N.A. Wilmington, DE · N
    $552B
    1Y +0.9% NPL 0.51%
  8. 08
    Truist Bank Charlotte, NC · NM
    $519B
    1Y -2.1% NPL 0.53%
  9. 09
    Capital One, N.A. McLean, VA · N
    $479B
    1Y +4.8% NPL 1.14%
  10. 10
    TD Bank, N.A. Wilmington, DE · N
    $372B
    1Y -3.4% NPL 0.61%
  11. 11
    The Bank of New York Mellon New York, NY · SM
    $335B
    1Y +2.9% NPL 0.21%
  12. 12
    State Street Bank and Trust Boston, MA · SM
    $298B
    1Y +1.6% NPL 0.18%
  13. 13
    Charles Schwab Bank, SSB Westlake, TX · SB
    $288B
    1Y -4.9% NPL 0.12%
  14. 14
    First-Citizens Bank & Trust Raleigh, NC · NM
    $221B
    1Y +58.0% NPL 0.72%
  15. 15
    Citizens Bank, N.A. Providence, RI · N
    $221B
    1Y -0.6% NPL 0.71%

Bar length is total assets on a shared scale (top bank = full width). The NPL chip turns oxblood when noncurrent loans exceed the 0.62% national average; the 1Y chip is muted when assets shrank. First-Citizens' outsized growth reflects its 2023 acquisition of the failed Silicon Valley Bridge Bank.

Schedule RC · Concentration

A Few Giants, a Long Tail

Illustrative

Sort the same 4,497 banks by size and the shape of the industry appears. The top bar is every charter, split by asset tier; the bottom bar is every dollar of assets, split the same way. They are near mirror images. More than three thousand community banks are the overwhelming majority of the count and less than a tenth of the money; a dozen mega-institutions are the reverse, holding 44% of all assets. Where the two bars invert is the concentration of American finance.

  • Community < $1B
  • Midsize $1B - $10B
  • Regional $10B - $50B
  • Super-regional $50B - $250B
  • Mega > $250B
Share of banks (count of charters) Community: 69.4% of banks 69.4% Midsize: 22.5% of banks 22.5% Regional: 6.3% of banks Super-regional: 1.6% of banks Mega: 0.3% of banks Share of assets (dollars) Community: 8.4% of assets 8.4% Midsize: 12.1% of assets 12.1% Regional: 15.7% of assets 15.7% Super-regional: 20.3% of assets 20.3% Mega: 43.5% of assets 43.5%
Both bars run the full 0-100% width and use one green ramp, light (community) to dark (mega). The community tier is 69% of the top bar and 8.4% of the bottom; the mega tier does the opposite. Tier cutoffs follow common regulatory size bands. Counts and shares are illustrative stand-ins.
Every tier, in a table
Tier Range Banks Share of banks Share of assets
Mega > $250B 12 0.3% 43.5%
Super-regional $50B - $250B 70 1.6% 20.3%
Regional $10B - $50B 285 6.3% 15.7%
Midsize $1B - $10B 1,010 22.5% 12.1%
Community < $1B 3,120 69.4% 8.4%

Illustrative figures in the real FDIC shape. Share of banks is the count of charters in the tier; share of assets is their combined size. Real figures bin the institutions census by the ASSET column; swap-point in HANDOFF.md.

Schedule RI · Earnings

Quarter by Quarter

Illustrative

Net income is what the industry actually earned each quarter. It runs a steady $60-to-$80 billion - except 2023 Q4, when a one-time deposit-insurance special assessment (levied to cover the 6 failures of the shakeout) cut profits by nearly half and dragged industry return on assets to a floor. The ROA line below reads the same story as a rate.

Net income, $ billions per quarter 020406080 2022 Q1: $59.7B net income 2022 Q1 2022 Q2: $64.4B net income 2022 Q2 2022 Q3: $71.7B net income 2022 Q3 2022 Q4: $68.4B net income 2022 Q4 2023 Q1: $79.8B net income, 2 failures 2023 Q1 2023 Q2: $70.8B net income, 1 failure 2023 Q2 2023 Q3: $68.4B net income, 1 failure 2023 Q3 2023 Q4: $38.4B net income, 1 failure 2023 Q4 2024 Q1: $64.3B net income 2024 Q1 2024 Q2: $71.5B net income, 1 failure 2024 Q2 2024 Q3: $65.4B net income 2024 Q3 2024 Q4: $66.8B net income 2024 Q4 Industry return on assets, % 2022 Q1: ROA 1.00% 2022 Q2: ROA 1.08% 2022 Q3: ROA 1.19% 2022 Q4: ROA 1.12% 2023 Q1: ROA 1.28% 2023 Q2: ROA 1.17% 2023 Q3: ROA 1.13% 2023 Q4: ROA 0.63% 2024 Q1: ROA 1.06% 2024 Q2: ROA 1.16% 2024 Q3: ROA 1.06% 2024 Q4: ROA 1.08% 0.63%
Columns marked with a dot are quarters that saw at least one insured-bank failure. The 2023 Q4 trough is the special-assessment quarter, not an operating collapse.
Quarterly figures, in a table
Quarter Assets ($T) Net income ($B) ROA Banks Failures
2022 Q1 23.6 59.7 1.00% 4,796 0
2022 Q2 23.4 64.4 1.08% 4,771 0
2022 Q3 23.5 71.7 1.19% 4,746 0
2022 Q4 23.7 68.4 1.12% 4,715 0
2023 Q1 23.7 79.8 1.28% 4,672 2
2023 Q2 23.9 70.8 1.17% 4,645 1
2023 Q3 23.6 68.4 1.13% 4,614 1
2023 Q4 23.7 38.4 0.63% 4,587 1
2024 Q1 23.8 64.3 1.06% 4,568 0
2024 Q2 24.0 71.5 1.16% 4,539 1
2024 Q3 24.2 65.4 1.06% 4,517 0
2024 Q4 24.4 66.8 1.08% 4,487 0

Illustrative industry aggregates in the real FDIC shape. Note the bank count falls every quarter - from consolidation, not failure. Real figures roll up from the per-bank financials.csv panel over REPDTE; see HANDOFF.md.

Schedule RC-B · Securities

The Rate Trap

Illustrative

Here is the pressure the earnings line never shows. As the Federal Reserve raised rates through 2022, the bonds banks already held lost market value, and the industry's unrealized loss on its securities book ballooned past $685B. On paper it costs nothing - until depositors leave and a bank must sell those bonds at a loss to pay them. That is exactly the trap Silicon Valley Bank walked into in 2023 Q1, with roughly $515B of such losses still sitting across the industry.

Unrealized loss on securities, $ billions SVB fails, Mar 2023 $685B 2022 Q12022 Q32023 Q12023 Q32024 Q12024 Q3 0250500750
The shaded band is the industry-wide paper loss on securities held at amortized cost and available for sale. It peaks with the 2022 Q3 rate-hike cycle, eases when the bond market rallies at year-ends, and by 2024 Q4 still stands near $482B - a standing overhang, not a one-time hit. A healthy bank never realizes it; a bank facing a run has no choice. Figures are illustrative stand-ins on the real FDIC securities schedule.
Unrealized losses by quarter, in a table
Quarter Unrealized loss ($B) Failures
2022 Q1 205 0
2022 Q2 445 0
2022 Q3 685 0
2022 Q4 618 0
2023 Q1 515 2
2023 Q2 558 1
2023 Q3 684 1
2023 Q4 478 1
2024 Q1 517 0
2024 Q2 513 1
2024 Q3 364 0
2024 Q4 482 0

Illustrative levels in the real FDIC shape - the trajectory (a 2022 run-up, a standing overhang since) tracks the real Quarterly Banking Profile, but the exact billions are stand-ins. Real figures roll up from the securities schedule (available-for-sale and held-to-maturity marks) over REPDTE; see HANDOFF.md.

Historical events · Failures

The Shakeout

Illustrative

In the spring of 2023 three regional banks failed in eight weeks - Silicon Valley Bank, Signature, and First Republic - carrying more than $538B in assets between them, the largest failures since 2008. Then the panic passed and the pattern reverted to what it usually is: a handful of small community banks a year, orders of magnitude smaller. The timeline plots every failure since 2023 by date and by assets at failure, on a log scale - the only way three giants and a $50M community bank share one frame.

Assets at failure (log scale) eight weeks, spring 2023 Silicon Valley Bank - Mar 10, 2023: $209B assets, $18.9B DIF cost Silicon Valley Signature Bank - Mar 12, 2023: $110B assets, $2.5B DIF cost Signature First Republic Bank - May 1, 2023: $213B assets, $15.6B DIF cost First Republic Heartland Tri-State Bank - Jul 28, 2023: $140M assets, $40M DIF cost Citizens Bank - Nov 3, 2023: $60M assets, $10M DIF cost Republic First Bank - Apr 26, 2024: $6.0B assets, $670M DIF cost Republic First The First National Bank of Lindsay - Oct 18, 2024: $110M assets, $40M DIF cost Pulaski Savings Bank - Nov 15, 2024: $50M assets, $30M DIF cost $100M$1B$10B$100B Jan 23Jul 23Jan 24Jul 24
Each dot is one failed bank; the larger dots are the three that carried $1B or more. The vertical scale is logarithmic, so each gridline is ten times the one below - the visual distance between First Republic and a $50M community bank is four full factors of ten. Names, dates, and assets trace the real FDIC failures list; deposit-insurance costs are FDIC estimates. Together the shakeout cost the insurance fund roughly $38B.
Every failure, in a table
Bank Failed Assets DIF cost
Silicon Valley Bank Santa Clara, CA Mar 10, 2023 $209B $18.9B
Signature Bank New York, NY Mar 12, 2023 $110B $2.5B
First Republic Bank San Francisco, CA May 1, 2023 $213B $15.6B
Heartland Tri-State Bank Elkhart, KS Jul 28, 2023 $140M $40M
Citizens Bank Sac City, IA Nov 3, 2023 $60M $10M
Republic First Bank Philadelphia, PA Apr 26, 2024 $6.0B $670M
The First National Bank of Lindsay Lindsay, OK Oct 18, 2024 $110M $40M
Pulaski Savings Bank Chicago, IL Nov 15, 2024 $50M $30M

Illustrative figures traced on the real FDIC failures list. DIF cost is the FDIC's estimated hit to the Deposit Insurance Fund - the industry-funded pool that makes insured depositors whole; the 2023 special assessment in the earnings section is how the industry repaid it. The section filters FAILYR >= 2023; swap-point in HANDOFF.md.

Schedule RC-N · Growth & asset quality

Growing, and Growing Risky

Illustrative

Size is not the same as safety. Plot each of the fifteen largest banks by how fast it grew over the year against how much of its loan book has gone bad, and the field splits four ways. The banks to watch sit in the upper right - expanding and carrying above-average noncurrent loans. The consumer-credit lenders, Capital One, Discover, American Express, live there by design: higher charge-offs are the price of higher yields. 4 of the fifteen sit above the national noncurrent-loan line.

  • At or below the national loan line
  • Above it (more bad debt)
  • Bubble area = total assets
shrank grew national noncurrent line 0.62% -6-4-20+2+4+6+8+10 0.00.30.60.91.21.5 1-year asset growth, % → noncurrent loans, % of loans JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.: +6.1% 1-year growth, 0.55% noncurrent loans, $4.02T assets Bank of America, N.A.: +2.4% 1-year growth, 0.48% noncurrent loans, $2.67T assets Citibank, N.A.: -1.2% 1-year growth, 0.71% noncurrent loans, $1.93T assets Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.: -0.8% 1-year growth, 0.62% noncurrent loans, $1.89T assets U.S. Bank, N.A.: +1.1% 1-year growth, 0.44% noncurrent loans, $663B assets Goldman Sachs Bank USA: +3.7% 1-year growth, 0.39% noncurrent loans, $555B assets PNC Bank, N.A.: +0.9% 1-year growth, 0.51% noncurrent loans, $552B assets Truist Bank: -2.1% 1-year growth, 0.53% noncurrent loans, $519B assets Capital One, N.A.: +4.8% 1-year growth, 1.14% noncurrent loans, $479B assets TD Bank, N.A.: -3.4% 1-year growth, 0.61% noncurrent loans, $372B assets The Bank of New York Mellon: +2.9% 1-year growth, 0.21% noncurrent loans, $335B assets State Street Bank and Trust: +1.6% 1-year growth, 0.18% noncurrent loans, $298B assets Charles Schwab Bank, SSB: -4.9% 1-year growth, 0.12% noncurrent loans, $288B assets Citizens Bank, N.A.: -0.6% 1-year growth, 0.71% noncurrent loans, $221B assets First-Citizens: +58% 1-year growth (off scale, SVB bridge-bank acquisition), 0.72% noncurrent loans First-Citizens +58% » JPMorganCapital OneSchwab
Each bubble is one bank; its area is total assets, so the megabanks read as large discs and the smallest of the fifteen as coins. The vertical rule is zero growth; the horizontal rule is the 0.62% national noncurrent-loan average, above which a bubble is drawn oxblood. First-Citizens' +58% is the acquisition of the failed Silicon Valley Bridge Bank and is pinned off-scale at the right edge. Growth and loan-quality ratios are illustrative stand-ins.
The fifteen, in a table
Bank Assets 1Y growth Noncurrent loans vs national
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. $4.02T +6.1% 0.55% at/below
Bank of America, N.A. $2.67T +2.4% 0.48% at/below
Citibank, N.A. $1.93T -1.2% 0.71% above
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. $1.89T -0.8% 0.62% at/below
U.S. Bank, N.A. $663B +1.1% 0.44% at/below
Goldman Sachs Bank USA $555B +3.7% 0.39% at/below
PNC Bank, N.A. $552B +0.9% 0.51% at/below
Truist Bank $519B -2.1% 0.53% at/below
Capital One, N.A. $479B +4.8% 1.14% above
TD Bank, N.A. $372B -3.4% 0.61% at/below
The Bank of New York Mellon $335B +2.9% 0.21% at/below
State Street Bank and Trust $298B +1.6% 0.18% at/below
Charles Schwab Bank, SSB $288B -4.9% 0.12% at/below
First-Citizens Bank & Trust $221B +58.0% 0.72% above
Citizens Bank, N.A. $221B -0.6% 0.71% above

Illustrative figures in the real FDIC call-report shape. Noncurrent loans are loans 90+ days past due or nonaccrual as a share of the loan book (a NPERFV-derived field); the national average is itself an illustrative baseline. Swap-point in HANDOFF.md.

Schedule RC-R · Capital

How Much Cushion

Illustrative

After the drama, the reassurance. A bank's Tier 1 leverage ratio is its capital measured against its assets - how much of the balance sheet can evaporate before the bank is insolvent. Regulators call a bank well-capitalized at 5%. The distribution of all 4,262 insured banks does not cluster near that floor; it clusters more than twice above it, around 11-12%. The failures were about liquidity - cash to meet a run - far more than solvency.

Number of banks by Tier 1 leverage band < 8% leverage: 41 banks (1.0%) 41 < 8% 8-9% leverage: 210 banks (4.9%) 210 8-9% 9-10% leverage: 742 banks (17.4%) 742 9-10% 10-11% leverage: 1,105 banks (25.9%) 1,105 10-11% 11-12% leverage: 812 banks (19.1%) 812 11-12% 12-13% leverage: 476 banks (11.2%) 476 12-13% 13-15% leverage: 560 banks (13.1%) 560 13-15% > 15% leverage: 316 banks (7.4%) 316 > 15% median band 04008001,200
Each column is the number of banks whose Tier 1 leverage ratio falls in that band; the deepest column is the modal band, 10-11%, holding 1,105 banks. The 5% well-capitalized floor sits to the left of the entire chart - even the lowest band shown clears it. Capital is a solvency backstop, not a liquidity one, which is why a well-capitalized bank can still fail in a weekend. The distribution is an illustrative stand-in on the real FDIC capital schedule.
Capital distribution, in a table
Tier 1 leverage band Banks Share
< 8% 41 1.0%
8-9% 210 4.9%
9-10% 742 17.4%
10-11% 1,105 25.9%
11-12% 812 19.1%
12-13% 476 11.2%
13-15% 560 13.1%
> 15% 316 7.4%
All insured banks 4,262 100.0%

Illustrative counts in the real FDIC shape. Tier 1 leverage is core capital over average total assets (RBCT1J); the well-capitalized threshold is 5%. Real figures bin the latest-quarter financials panel; swap-point in HANDOFF.md.

Compare two banks

Line up any two of the sixteen largest banks side by side - assets, return on assets and equity, capital, and risk, each flagged against the national average. Fully static, no JavaScript.

Open the compare tool →

Methodology

Notes on the Data

The figures on this page are shaped by FDIC BankFind Suite (2024 Q4 (Dec 31, 2024) call reports; failures through 2024), the FDIC's public record of every insured institution - its quarterly Call Report financials, its branch network, and its complete failures history back to 1934. One record is one insured bank, keyed by its FDIC certificate number (CERT). Assets, deposits, and income come from the quarterly call reports; return on assets and the capital ratios are the FDIC's own computed fields.

What's real, what's a stand-in

This build is badged Illustrative. The structure is real - every field maps to a named FDIC column, and the largest-bank roster, their approximate asset sizes, and the 2023-24 failures (Silicon Valley, Signature, First Republic, and the small community banks that followed) are grounded on a live BankFind query. The exact ratios, the per-state rollups, the quarterly earnings and unrealized-loss series, the size-tier split, and the Tier 1 leverage distribution are representative stand-ins, hand-authored to the right order of magnitude - and, where an event is real (the 2023 Q4 special assessment, the 2022 rate-driven run-up in securities losses), to the right shape. Every section carries the Illustrative chip, and the swap-point - which FDIC file and column feeds each number - is documented in the repo's HANDOFF.md. We never present a stand-in as real.

What you're not seeing

Assets are booked at a charter's headquarters state, so the map's asset column overstates a handful of states (Ohio, North Carolina, South Dakota, Delaware) that host a single megabank charter transacting nationwide - the map's shade deliberately encodes bank count, not assets, to avoid that distortion. Holding companies are not consolidated here: JPMorgan's bank charter is one row, not the whole firm, so these totals are smaller than the headline "JPMorgan" you read in the news. Credit unions are not FDIC-insured and are absent entirely. And a quarter-end snapshot cannot show a bank that was healthy on the call report and gone six weeks later - which is exactly what happened in March 2023.


Generated 2026-07-07 01:53 UTC. Source: FDIC BankFind Suite. Vintage: 2024 Q4 (Dec 31, 2024) call reports; failures through 2024.